On Marx discourse: two readings...

Marx in his earlier writings (see Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) sees the coming of a postcapitalist socialist society as a result of the consciousness of the alienation imposed by the capitalist society to the proletariat class. This alienation is based on the lack of ‘humanist sense’, seen by Marx, as the lack of control over the means of production. One may argue that the control over the means of production elevated to the universal category of a ‘humanist sense’ is an essentialist view; therefore, critics on essentialism of the human condition may deconstruct the critic of capitalist economy based on alienation. In fact, from a materialistic point of view, alienation may be seen as a critic coming from a past system of values developed in earlier stages of society in contrast with a new socio-economic order. Nevertheless, the essentialist posture has one more ace under the hand: every change made by human will, is understood, and sometimes even originated by an essentialist conception of man. Therefore, human will as a historical tool is tied, in practice, by essentialist postures. Criticism on Marxist alienation based on criticism over essentialism would lead to the confrontation of the historical power of human will, as formulated by humanist philosophy, against the historical extension of structural social evolution.

The humanist and therefore idealistic philosophical nature of alienation as a critic of capitalism was probably the reason why Marx abandoned this point of view for a more structural critic of capitalism (see Capital) replacing it by the intensification of class struggle as a result of the growing ‘exploitation of the proletariat’. It is worth noting that, while the first argument, based on alienation, is more attractive to well remunerated workers, which in modern capitalistic societies comes to be a large piece of the population. The latter argument, exploitation, is attractive to the lower class workers in conditions of exploitation, characteristic of earlier capitalistic societies. Therefore, alienation is an attractive motive and argument in ‘developed countries’ where large pieces of the population has specialised and well remunerated labour, while ‘exploitation’ is the case for developing countries where labour conditions get closer to the earlier stages of capitalism.

A criticism of Marxism

"it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness." (Marx, in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.)
Hence, universality of consciousness concerns to what is universal in the social existence.

The purpose is to specify what Marx means by "social existence" in a synthetic way. In particular seeing it as a "measure" of a more general 'social existence' of men and this last concept, at the same time, seen as a particular 'existence' for men, which may have 'existences' other than social. Finally, not just for men but for a more general category: CAS.

'Objective' is an agents universal distinction over the context being used. Example: "some say love is luck, others say is not". In the latter statement 'love' as a feeling condition, constitutes the object regarding to the agents 'some' and 'others' (which themselves constitutes objects under some existence condition regarding to the receptor of the statement), while in the statement: "some say love exists others don't", 'love' as a feeling condition don't constitute an object because there is no consensus regarding it's existence as a feeling condition. Of course we have assumed in the interpretation of the last two statements that 'some' and 'others' are referring to 'love' as a feeling condition, in case of the last statement, of arguable existence. Note that in the second statement, 'love' as a semantic condition constitutes an object. But even as a semantic condition we can find a no semantical object, as is the case in the statement: "some say kapush is a word others don't".
In order to address a 'distinction' in a given set of agents, from a sociocognitive dynamics, there must be a condition of existence to which this 'something' constitutes an object (within the set of agents). In 'kapush', if we assume it as an oral utterance, the 'object condition' has to be traced down up to a phonetic consensus, assuming both distinguishes uniquely the oral utterance: kapush!. Interesting questions depart from above; what other existence conditions can we find in the social use? what are the relations between the diverse existence conditions (developing useful schemes)?
'Subjective' is an agent dependent distinction over the context being used. From a sociocognitive dynamics, the existence of an 'object' (of at least one existence condition) precedes that of a 'subjective' distinction.
As opposed to 'objects', 'interpretation' refers to agent dependent increasing distinctions over objects.
If we read carefully the definition of 'objective' we will notice we defined 'objective' using the concept of 'distinction'. At the same time in the next paragraph we state that from a sociognitive dynamics, 'objectivness' precedes 'distinction'. This is the kind of paradoxes which arises in communication theory where one has to use communication to talk about communication. Interestingly, this is a problem you also find in cosmology, in the roots of the 'anthropic principle'. Looking closely to the paradox as found it in our disscusion of 'objects' and 'distinctions', we find that actually when we said 'objects' are precede by 'distinctions' this is an analytical precedence: a definition, an the opposed precedence is a dynamical relation: sociognitive dynamics. Es dificil no pensar en 'Ouroborus' como símbolo de esta paradoja, sin embargo, creo que una mejor analogía es la de pensar en la instancia de un lenguaje, topológicamente igual a un círculo y tal que analíticamente se lee en una dirección y dinámicamente en la dirección opuesta. Más aún, si pensamos en que el pensamiento analítico es en sí un fenómeno dinámico, podemos resolver esta nueva contradicción, distinguiendo la representación de los espacios físicos en que transcurre el pensamiento analítico y en que transcurre la dinámica social o física ah! e aquí de nuevo la paradoja, nos enfrentamos realmente Ouroborus!.

Existence concerns to all the different categorizations of experience for a CAS: Synchronic and diachronic experience. The first one, enforced by repetition and leading to time independent reality schemes; a static interpretation of objects. The second one, enforced by unpredictability leading to a historical or singular interpretation of objects. In order to have an equivalence between the concepts of time and space in replace of synchronic and diachronic we will talk of globally temporal and locally temporal. Analogously we may introduce the concepts of globally spatial and locally spatial. Given the cognitive nature of our subject of study, is important to clarify that whenever we speak about time or space in this context, actually what we mean by that is CAS time as for example anthropological time, and CAS space, meaning a CAS context or surrounding. The concept of local time as origin of singular interpretations doesn't has much sense if is not attached to the concept of local space. Because is precisely the notion of local time what allows, in a dynamic sense, the existence of local time as a social experience. Therefore we speak of spatiotemporal locality.

After all this we can state an hypotesis about the latter citation from Marx: he refers to 'social existence' as a globally temporal experience, which lead us to the conclusion that, either he underestimate or doesn't considers local spatiotemporal experiences as origins of consciousness on men.